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I. INTRODUCTION
Justice Scalia wrote in Capitol Square Review Board v. Pinette that "a
free-speech clause without religion would be Hamlet without the prince.
Accordingly, we have not excluded from free-speech protections religious
proselytizing."' But some judges and commentators are beginning to treat
religious proselytizing as a pauper when it comes to the Free Speech
Clause.2  Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg all indicated that
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1. 515 U.S. 753, 760 (1995).
2. Many may recall fondly, as I do, Mark Twain's novel, The Prince and the Pauper, set in
161h century England, and depicting the adventures of two young boys who are so similar in
appearance that they switch places. Because one of the boys is the Prince of Wales, son of Henry
the VIII, and the other a poor waif from Offal Court, London, Twain uses the situation to decry
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proselytizing speech should be less protected than other types of religious
speech in their dissenting opinions in Good News Club v. Milford Central
School District.'
The dissenters in Good News are in sharp contrast to the holding of the
Supreme Court almost 70 years ago in the context of Jehovah's Witnesses
proselytizing and criticizing the Catholic Church in a predominantly
Catholic neighborhood.
To persuade others to his own point of view, the pleader, as we
know, at times, resorts to exaggeration, to vilification of men who
have been, or are, prominent in church or state, and even to false
statement. But the people of this nation have ordained in the light
of history, that, in spite of the probability of excesses and abuses,
these liberties are, in the long view, essential to enlightened opinion
and right conduct on the part of the citizens of a democracy.4
Proselytizing is an attempt to persuade others that your point of view is
the right one-often within the context of religious conviction, but not
necessarily. Attempts to convince one's fellow citizens of the merit of a
particular idea, such as global warming or the evils of war, is just as much
proselytizing as is persuasive religious speech. Both involve an attempt at
conversion from one perspective to another.5
This essay reviews, in Section II, the cases holding that proselytizing
religious speech is just as protected as other types of proselytizing speech.
Section III identifies recent cases demonstrating proselytizing speech is
under attack in America, while Section IV speculates on the reasons this
well-settled law is being questioned. Finally, Section V concludes that we
must do everything possible to check this erosion of our first freedom and
continue to zealously guard religious speech's royal position as prince of
free speech.6
the inequality between the classes in London. So the novel is useful as a literary picture
demonstrating the inequality we are beginning to see between free speech protection for religious
proselytizing and all other attempts at persuasive speech.
3. 533 U.S. 98 (2001).
4. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940).
5. See Child Evangelism Fellowship of N.J. v. Stafford Twp. Sch. Dist., 386 F.3d 514, 528
(3rd Cir. 2004) (discussed in depth below).
6. This article does not attempt to address situations where proselytizing speech by private
individuals may be attributable to the government, such as in the student / public school context,
or legislative prayer. See Jay Alan Sekulow, James Henderson & John Tuskey, Proposed
Guidelines For Student Religious Speech And Observance In Public Schools, 46 MERCER L. REV.
1017 (1995), for a discussion of this issue in schools. Contra Kathleen A. Brady, The Push To
Private Religious Expression: Are We Missing Something?, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1147 (2002).
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II. THE HISTORY OF PROTECTION FOR
RELIGIOUS PROSELYTIZING SPEECH AND THE
RATIONALE UNDERLYING IT
Since Cantwell v. Connecticut, a long line of cases have recognized the
importance of religious proselytizing. One of the most notable is Murdock
v. Pennsylvania, where the Court struck down a permit fee for distributing
religious literature door-to-door, holding:
This form of evangelism ... occupies the same high estate under
the First Amendment as do[es] worship in the churches and
preaching from the pulpits.... It has the same claim to protection
as the more orthodox and conventional exercises of religion. It also
has the same claim as the others to the guarantees of freedom of
speech and freedom of the press.7
The defendants in Murdock were Jehovah's Witnesses who would ask
for a certain amount of money for their religious books, but if an individual
could not afford the price, a reduced price was accepted or the literature was
given to them for free.' The literature was characterized by the Court as
"provocative, abusive, and ill-mannered" and an "assault . . . on our
established churches and the cherished faiths of many of us."9
Nevertheless, the conviction of the defendants for failing to pay a licensing
fee to distribute the religious literature was reversed because "spreading
one's religious beliefs or preaching the Gospel through distribution of
religious literature and through personal visitations is an age-old type of
evangelism with as high a claim to constitutional protection as the more
orthodox types."'
The federal courts of appeal and district courts have also specifically
protected religious proselytizing speech. For instance, the Fourth Circuit
held that a religious organization that organized Bible studies for children in
Maryland could not be denied access to a school's literature distribution
program merely because the purpose of the evangelical organization was to
proselytize." Other organizations such as the American Red Cross, the
Shakespeare Theatre, the Audubon Naturalist Society, and scouting groups
were permitted to distribute literature to students containing "information
about community, charitable, and education-related activities, cultural and
sporting events, and health issues."' 2 The school's refusal to grant Child
7. 319 U.S. 105, 108-09 (1943).
8. Id. at 106-07.
9. Id. at 115-16.
10. Id. at 110.
11. Child Evangelism Fellowship of Md. v. Montgomery County Pub. Schs., 373 F.3d 589,
594 (4th Cir. 2004).
12. Id. at 593.
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Evangelism Fellowship the same access merely because its purpose was
religious proselytization was unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination. 3
The Third Circuit came to a similar conclusion, finding that a school
could not exclude Child Evangelism Fellowship from access to programs
designed to allow community groups to communicate with students. 4 In an
opinion authored by Judge (now Justice) Alito, the court recognized that
groups such as the 4-H Club and the PTA proselytize by recruiting
members. "To proselytize means both 'to recruit members for an
institution, team, or group' and 'to convert from one religion, belief,
opinion, or party to another.' The record shows that the school district does
not reject groups that proselytize in the sense of recruiting members."' 5 The
court then held that denying a religious organization the same rights
because its proselytizing involves religious speech is viewpoint
discrimination.
6
The Tenth Circuit has also held that religious proselytizing speech is no
less protected than other types of speech. It addressed this issue in an equal
access case that involved the showing of a proselytizing film at a senior
citizen center operated by the city of Albuquerque, New Mexico. 7 The city
argued it was justified in excluding the film about the life of Christ because
it concluded with an invitation to convert to Christianity. But the court held
that "[t]he Supreme Court . . . has rejected the notion that speech about
religion, religious speech designed to win converts, and religious worship
by persons already converted should be treated differently under the First
Amendment."'"
The same principle has been held to apply to student proselytizing
speech. In Slotterback v. Interboro School District, the district court struck
down a school's ban on distribution of material "that proselytizes a
particular political or religious belief.' 9 The court reasoned that "a public
secondary school environment is not fully 'educational' where students'
personal intercommunication is restricted to particular issues. Such
restrictions stunt the growth of budding citizens and budding minds and are
invalid absent a legitimate constitutional justification." 0
13. Id. at 594.
14. Child Evangelism Fellowship of N.J. v. Stafford Twp. Sch. Dist., 386 F.3d 514, 528 (3rd
Cir. 2004).
15. Id. (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1821 (Merriam
Webster 1976)).
16. Id.
17. Church on the Rock v. City of Albuquerque, 84 F.3d 1273 (10th Cir. 1996).
18. 84 F.3d at 1278 (citing Widmar, 454 U.S. at 269 n.6; and Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr.
Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993)).
19. 766 F. Supp. 293 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (italics in original).
20. Id. at 293-94.
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In his Good News Club concurrence, Justice Scalia observed that if
non-religious groups are permitted to state their opinion on a particular
issue-such as morality-and persuasively explain the rationale underlying
their opinions, religious groups must be able to do so also. There is
absolutely no reason why religious proselytizing speech should be any less
protected than secular proselytizing speech. Penalizing religious groups
because their persuasive speech happens to be religious is blatant viewpoint
discrimination.21  In other words, "A priest has as much liberty to
proselytize as a patriot."2"
Protecting religious proselytizing speech the same as other persuasive
speech makes sense. Everyone agrees that Al Gore's speech in his
campaign against manmade global warming is a protected expression of his
views. And he is clearly attempting to convince others to adopt his views
as their own. Gore's speech is just as "proselytizing" as an attempt to
convince others to convert to Christianity. By definition, "proselytizing"
does not just refer to religious speech, but also includes recruiting
"someone to join one's party, institution, or cause."23 Therefore, restricting
religious proselytizing without placing the same limits on other types of
persuasive speech is viewpoint discrimination, plain and simple. And we
leave the decision of what views should be expressed to the individual, not
the government, because "use of such freedom will ultimately produce a
more capable citizenry and more perfect polity and in the belief that no
other approach would comport with the premise of individual dignity and
choice upon which our political system rests. 24
III. THE ATTACK ON RELIGIOUS
PROSELYTIZING SPEECH
But the history and common sense underlying the protection of
religious proselytizing has not kept it from being placed under siege by
many judges in America today. The Good News case illustrates the recent
flirtation by some judges with the idea that religious proselytizing is sub-
standard speech. Good News is an equal access case involving use of
school facilities that had been opened up to community organizations. The
defendant, Milford Central School, was a New York public school that
21. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch. Dist., 533 U.S. at 124-26 (Scalia, J., concurring).
22. Id. at 121 (Scalia, J., concurring).
23. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, supra note 15, at 1821. See also
Child Evangelism Fellowship of N.J. v. Stafford Twp. Sch. Dist., 386 F.3d 514, 528 (3rd Cir.
2004) ("To proselytize means both 'to recruit members for an institution, team, or group' and 'to
convert from one religion, belief, opinion, or party to another."' (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1821 (Merriam Webster 1976)).
24. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971).
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allowed its facilities to be used by the community for "social, civic and
recreational meetings and entertainment events, and other uses pertaining to
the welfare of the community, provided that such uses shall be
nonexclusive and shall be opened to the general public."25  Stephen and
Darlene Fournier asked for permission to use school facilities during non-
school hours to hold meetings for a Good News Club that taught students
Biblical morality. The Fourniers sued on behalf of the Club when the
school denied their request.
The majority found the school violated the Free Speech Clause because
it excluded the Good News Club from a limited public forum based solely
on its religious views of morality. Other groups, such as scouting
organizations, were permitted access to the school to teach about morality
from a secular perspective.26 The Court determined that the Good News
Club's speech was merely a religious view on the otherwise permissible
topic of morality, even though the Club's speech could be characterized as
"evangelical. 2 7 28
But three Justices dissented, arguing that evangelical or "proselytizing"
religious speech is less protected than other types of religious speech and
could properly be excluded from the forum by the school. Justice Stevens'
dissent first divides religious speech into three categories: (1) a religious
point of view about a particular topic; (2) worship; and (3) proselytizing
speech, which is described as speech aimed at "inculcating belief in a
particular religious faith."29 He then concludes that religious proselytizing
speech may be excluded by the school because it may be "divisive. ' 3
In his dissent, Justice Souter, who is joined by Justice Ginsburg,
characterizes the Good News Club meetings as "an evangelical service of
worship calling children to commit themselves in an act of Christian
conversion. '31  He then agrees with Justice Stevens "that Good News's
activities may be characterized as proselytizing and therefore as outside the
purpose of Milford's limited forum."32
25. 533 U.S. at 102.
26. Id. at 108-112.
27. Id. at It2 n.4.
28. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 786 (Merriam Webster 1981)
(defining "evangelize" as "to convert to Christianity").
29. 533 U.S. at 130.
30. Id. at 13 1. In fairness to Justice Stevens, he also argues that attempts to recruit others to
one's political party could be excluded from a limited public forum. 533 U.S. at 131. But like
religious speech, there is no reason to treat proselytizing political speech differently. Moreover,
does this apply only to recruiting someone to a political party like the Democrats, or does it apply
to recruiting someone to join one's political action committee? If not, why not, and if so, how is a
school official to tell the difference between an attempt to inform and an attempt to persuade?
Another conundrum is discerning what is, and is not, political speech. Virtually all topics, from
the artistic merit of nude dancing to Zionism, have some sort of political import.
31. 533 U.S. at 138.
32. Id. at 138 n.3.
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Judges in lower courts are also increasingly willing to cabin religious
proselytizing speech into a different, less protected category. For instance,
in Chandler v. James, the Eleventh Circuit does an excellent job of
explaining why student religious speech in public schools is protected,
striking down an injunction requiring school administrators to prohibit
student religious speech during all school events.33  But the court
inexplicably concludes its opinion by stating: "[t]he Constitution requires
that schools permit religious expression, not religious proselytizing ...
Proselytizing speech is inherently coercive and, the Constitution prohibits it
from the government's pulpit.
34
The court cites Lee v. Weisman for this proposition, but that case does
not even mention proselytizing speech-much less hold that it is
"inherently coercive. 35 The Eleventh Circuit completely fails to explain
how religious proselytizing speech is any more coercive than, say political,
environmentalist, or animal rights proselytizing speech. Its logic dictates
that the student in a school assembly recruiting students to join the
environmental club to work toward outlawing Sport Utility Vehicles is
protected, but the school must censor the student that opines, "One of the
first commandments God gave to mankind was to take care of the Garden
of Eden, so those of you who drive SUVs are being disobedient to God. I
invite you to convert to Christianity so that we can take better care of the
Earth."
The Ninth Circuit issued a similar ruling in Hills v. Scottsdale Unified
School District where it addressed a school's discrimination against a
summer camp because it offered classes on the Bible. 36 The court struck
down the school's policy allowing community groups to advertise summer
camps through the school's literature distribution system, but prohibited
Mr. Hills from telling students and parents about the Bible classes offered at
his summer camp. After correctly finding this resulted in impermissible
discrimination against religious views, the court felt compelled to limit its
holding by saying that the school could exclude literature that "contains
proselytizing language."3 7 So the school could censor Mr. Hills' brochure
that says, "Did you know that if a child does not come to the knowledge of
JESUS CHRIST, and learn the importance of Bible reading by age 12,
chances are slim that they ever will in this life? We think it is important to
start as young as possible!"38 But it is highly unlikely that the court would
allow the school to censor the brochure of a summer camp that says, "Did
33. 180 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 1999),judgment vacated in Chandler v. Siegelman, 530 U.S.
1256 (2000), but reinstated in Chandler v. Siegelman, 230 F.3d 1313 (2000).
34. Id. at 1265 (citations omitted).
35. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
36. 329 F.3d 1044 (9th Cir. 2003).
37. Id. at 1052-1053.
38. Id. at 1052.
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you know that if a child does not develop a good understanding of ecology
and conservation habits by the age of 12, chances are slim they ever will in
this life?"
A classic example of how some judges view religious proselytizing as
less protected than secular proselytizing is found in Ridley v. Massachusetts
Bay Transportation Authority, where the First Circuit considered the
messages of two speakers: one advocating the legalization of marijuana and
the other a particular religious belief that rejected all organized religions."
Surprisingly, the court allowed the governmental entity to censor the
religious speech, but not the pro-drug message.
Ridley's facts provide no rationale for this distinction. The
Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority ("MBTA") opened its vehicles
up for speech for a fee. Change the Climate was a non-profit organization
that sought to "generate debate" about the criminalization of marijuana by
running an ad saying, "Police are too important . . . too valuable ... too
good.., to waste on arresting people for marijuana when real criminals are
on the loose."40 The First Circuit found that the MBTA's rejection of this
ad was impermissible viewpoint discrimination because other ads
encouraging compliance with drug laws were allowed."
Andre Ridley, a self-described prophet, also sought access to advertise
in the MBTA program with an ad stating that organized religions such as
Catholicism and Islam are false, and she is sent by God to tell the truth.
MBTA rejected this ad because it violated its rule prohibiting advertising
that "demeans or disparages an individual or group of individuals."42 The
First Circuit found this did not constitute viewpoint discrimination even
though an ad stating that Islam is a true religion would have been allowed.
The court reasoned that no one was permitted to denigrate another's
religion-even Ms. Ridley's-so there was no viewpoint discrimination.43
The court completely ignored the fact that some religious views-no
matter how positively stated-may be deemed "demeaning" or
"disparaging" to some, and censored on that basis. For instance, in Focus
on the Family v. Pinellas Suncoast Transit Authority, the Transit Authority
rejected advertising for an event on homosexual behavior saying, "Love
Won Out: Addressing, Understanding and Preventing Homosexuality in
Youth," because it might be "offensive."" The official rejecting the ad
testified that "the notion that homosexuality is preventable is highly
controversial and potentially offensive."45 Such an ad would be rejected
39. 390 F.3d 65 (1st Cir. 2004).
40. Id. at 72-73 (italics in original).
41. Id. at 88.
42. 290 F.3d at 95.
43. Id. at 91.
44. 344 F.3d 1263 (1I1th Cir. 2003).
45. 377 F.3d at 1270.
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under the MBTA rules because it may be demeaning to those engaged in
homosexual behavior. This clearly would be discrimination based on the
view expressed-not the way it was expressed-and completely legal under
the First Circuit's opinion in Ridley. Thus, the First Circuit allows
advocates for the legalization of marijuana to proselytize on public
transportation buses, even though the views expressed may be disparaging
of police officers by suggesting it is silly to place their lives at risk to
enforce the law. But proselytizing religious views that might be
disparaging are prohibited.
These opinions reflect a distinct effort to pauperize religious
proselytizing speech as compared to other types of persuasive expression,
despite the well-established protection of it in this country.
IV. THE SOURCE OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST
RELIGIOUS PROSELYTIZING SPEECH:
EMERGING "HATE SPEECH" BANS IN AMERICA
With all the authority strongly protecting religious proselytizing, it is
only natural to wonder about the source of the recent trend to give it less
protection. Why is a category of speech that has enjoyed so much
protection for so long now being viewed as "low value" speech that is
undeserving of full First Amendment safeguards? The answer is increasing
social disapproval of speech that may be perceived as offensive, or "hate
speech."
In R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul, the Supreme Court reviewed the conviction
of a teenager for burning a cross under a St. Paul, Minnesota ordinance that
provided:
Whoever places on public or private property a symbol, object,
appellation, characterization or graffiti, including, but not limited
to, a burning cross or Nazi swastika, which one knows or has
reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in
others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender commits
disorderly conduct and shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.46
The Court observed that:
[t]he First Amendment generally prevents government from
proscribing speech, or even expressive conduct, because of
disapproval of the ideas expressed. Content-based regulations are
presumptively invalid....
46. 505 U.S. 377, 379 (1992).
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The rationale of the general prohibition, after all, is that content
discrimination raises the specter that the Government may
effectively drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace."
The Court went on to clarify that this proscription applies to viewpoint
discrimination even if the speech is traditionally less protected like fighting
words, defamation, and obscenity. The Court compared the ability to
restrict fighting words-to which the Minnesota Supreme Court had limited
the ordinance-to regulating the noise of a sound truck. "As with the sound
truck, however, so also with fighting words: The government may not
regulate use based on hostility-or favoritism-towards the underlying
message expressed."48
Another example the Court notes involves commercial speech.
[A] State may choose to regulate price advertising in one industry
but not in others, because the risk of fraud (one of the
characteristics of commercial speech that justifies depriving it of
full First Amendment protection . . .), is in its view greater there.
But a State may not prohibit only that commercial advertising that
depicts men in a demeaning fashion. 9
So St. Paul's ordinance prohibiting insulting speech based on race, color,
creed, religion or gender, but allowing it on all other topics, was
unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination.
One could hold up a sign saying, for example, that all 'anti-Catholic
bigots' are misbegotten; but not that all 'papists' are, for that would
insult and provoke violence 'on the basis of religion.' St. Paul has
no such authority to license one side of a debate to fight freestyle,
while requiring the other to follow Marquis of Queensberry rules.5°
One would think that this case effectively prohibits governmental
entities from censoring religious proselytizing that may be considered
insulting or hate speech by some based on race, religion, sex, sexual
orientation, and so on. But government officials and even some courts
simply have not received-or choose to ignore-the message the Supreme
Court sent in R.A. V. As might be expected, restricting insulting or
offensive speech appears to be occurring most frequently in venues like
schools and government workplaces where speech is somewhat less
protected than in public places such as sidewalks and parks.
For example, in Harper v. Poway School District, the Ninth Circuit
held that school officials are permitted to censor the "negative" side of a
debate on homosexual behavior if the views expressed may be considered
47. Id. at 382 and 387 (citations and quotation marks omitted).
48. 505 U.S. at 386.
49. Id. at 388-89 (citations omitted).
50. Id. at 391-92.
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"demeaning" or "derogatory." 5' The court held that this viewpoint
censorship is justified because the speech infringes upon the rights of other
students, citing Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District.2 This
novel First Amendment theory means that students may express their view
that homosexual behavior should be approved, even encouraged, but
students holding the contrary view can-and arguably must-be censored.
Tinker held that a high school student's expression of opposition to the
Vietnam War by wearing a black armband could not be censored by
officials because it did not "materially disrupt[] classwork or involve[]
substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others."53 In Harper, the
Ninth Circuit latched onto the "invasion of the rights of others" language as
authority for school officials to censor any student speech that may be
perceived by other students as demeaning or derogatory. 4 Thus, students
who are offended or feel demeaned can censor the speech of other
students-a "heckler's veto."
This is a very troubling holding because "[a]ny word spoken, in class,
in the lunchroom, or on the campus, that deviates from the views of another
person may start an argument or cause a disturbance."55  Harper runs
contrary to Supreme Court precedent holding that "[s]peech cannot be...
punished or banned, simply because it might offend a hostile mob."56
The First Amendment rights of religious speakers are also increasingly
coming under attack in the government workplace. More and more cases
are being filed because of a government bias against persuasive speech that
happens to be religious. Like any workplace, government employers allow
employees to talk about non-work related issues so long as they are not
disruptive and the employees are still able to get their work done.57 But
when religious employees join the conversation on issues of the day such as
abortion and homosexual behavior, they are sometimes penalized for their
religious views.
For example, Lister v. Defense Logistics Agency was brought by a
federal employee who wanted to express his religious views on an
employee bulletin board that had been opened up to all types of speech.58
51. 445 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated as moot, 127 S.Ct. 1484 (2007).
52. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
53. Id. at513.
54. 445 F.3d at 1181. The holding in Harper directly conflicts with the Third Circuit's
opinion in Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200 (3rd Cir. 2001), which held that a
high school speech policy which prohibited negative, demeaning, and derogatory speech was
unconstitutional.
55. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508-09.
56. Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 134-35 (1992) (addressing
restriction based on adverse listener reaction to, inter alia, a demonstration in opposition to Martin
Luther King Day).
57. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
58. 482 F.Supp.2d 1003 (S.D. Ohio 2007).
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The government employer-a federal agency-allowed employees to post
items "of general interest" such as flyers seeking donations for inner city
service projects and the Combined Federal Campaign. Other flyers
advertised family wellness training, social, physical, mental, and spiritual
assistance programs, and information about "Blacks in Government"
meetings and a "Blacks in Government" social.5 9 One of the few items that
could not be posted was speech indicating a "religious preference."60
Mr. Lister decided to post a flyer communicating his religious view that
it is a mistake to give undesignated money to the Combined Federal
Campaign-a program for non-profits like the United Way to solicit money
from federal employees-because it could be used to support abortion,
sexual promiscuity, the homosexual agenda, and new age mysticism.6 The
flyer was not allowed to be posted because "employees are not permitted to
pursue religious or ideological agendas or campaigns during work hours."62
Thus, "an employee may post a notice for a political rally, demonstration,
school activity, etc. Yet, an employee is prohibited from advertising a
Christmas play, or lectures at a synagogue or meetings at a mosque."63 The
Court properly rejected this blatant viewpoint discrimination, holding:
"Once the government creates a board open for posting by employees of
virtually any noncommercial message, it may not exclude those messages
of a religious nature. The policies applicable to the bulletin board in this
case unreasonably restrict the Plaintiff's rights under the First
Amendment."'
Lister's experience is not an isolated incident. For example, the
Standards of Conduct for Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA")
employees provide: "the making of disparaging remarks, expressing
stereotypical views or displaying and/or distributing offensive material are
prohibited in the workplace."65 Such policies allow government employers
to discriminate against views on controversial subjects like religion and
homosexual behavior that they deem "offensive" or "stereotypical." The
FAA has in fact applied this policy in such a manner. In 2006, an FAA
employee filed suit in federal district court over discipline he was given
because he expressed to a co-worker his view that homosexual behavior
conflicts with Biblical teachings. No action was taken against the co-
59. Id. at 1005-06.
60. Id. at 1008.
61. Id. at 1006.
62. Id. (quotation marks omitted).
63. Id. at 1010.
64. 482 F.Supp.2d at 1011.
65. National Air Traffic Controllers Association, Standards of Conduct, available at
http://nwp.natca.org/Documents/LRStuff/ER_4.1-Standards-ofiConduct.pdf (last visited Aug.
11, 2008).
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worker who expressed the opposing view because her speech was not
considered offensive or stereotypical by management.
6
These attempts to censor offensive speech seen in R.A. V., Harper, and
by the FAA policy above are part of a movement within the United States
and elsewhere to eliminate "hate speech." For instance, Justice White's
concurrence in R.A. V. is concerned that the majority opinion "legitimates
hate speech as a form of public discussion. '67 But what is hate speech?
Justice White infers that it is limited to fighting words which are "directed
against individuals to provoke violence or to inflict injury. '"68
But other judges have not limited it this way-defining hate speech to
include speech that conveys any idea that is merely offensive. Chase
Harper's statement that "Homosexuality is Shameful - Romans 1:27" was
clearly not directed against an individual to provoke violence or inflict
injury, but was expressing his view that homosexual behavior is morally
wrong, in response to statements in support of homosexual behavior made
by other students. Nevertheless, in his concurrence to the denial of
rehearing en banc in Harper, Judge Gould labels it "hate speech."
Hate speech, whether in the form of a burning cross, or in the form
of a call for genocide, or in the form of a tee shirt misusing biblical
text to hold gay students to scorn, need not under Supreme Court
decisions be given the full protection of the First Amendment in the
context of the school environment, where administrators have a
duty to protect students from physical or psychological harms.69
So under Judge Gould's view, if an idea may be interpreted as holding
another to scorn, that is hate speech and not subject to the full protection of
the First Amendment that students expressing the opposing view receive.
This view licenses government officials to censor any speech that is
perceived by some as being scornful. Thus, the speech of animal rights
activists who hold those who use animals for experimentation in scorn
could be censored. Likewise, any disagreement with religious speech that
opines that the religious teachings of others are wrong could be censored.
Surely the anti-Catholic speech of Mr. Cantwell subjected Catholic folks to
scorn and could have been banned under this hate speech exception to the
First Amendment. Chief Judge Kozinski said it very well in his dissent in
the Harper case:
All manner of other speech, from the innocuous to the laudable,
could also be banned or punished under the school's hate speech
policy. May a student wear a Black Pride t-shirt, or does this
denigrate white and Asian students? May a student wear a t-shirt
66. Alliance Defense Fund, Press Release, available at
http://www.alliancedefensefund.org/news/pressrelease.aspx?cid=3785 (last visited Aug. 1, 2008).
67. 505 U.S. at 402.
68. /dat 401.
69. 455 F.3d 1052, 1053-54 (9th Cir. 2006).
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saying, "I love Jesus," or will this make Jews, Muslims and Druids
feel it's an attack on their religions? May a student wear a t-shirt
saying, "Proud to be a Turk," or will this cause bad vibrations for
the Greeks and Armenians in the school? Will a student be
disciplined for disruption if, during a lunch-time discussion, he
argues forcefully that the State of Israel oppresses Palestinians and,
when called on it, defends himself, saying: "I said it because I'm
proud to be a Muslim"?7 °
Despite the obvious use of hate speech prohibitions as a poorly
disguised excuse for viewpoint discrimination, commentators continue to
urge the withdrawal of hate speech from protection by the First
Amendment. For example, Professor Owen M. Fiss, in response to the
Supreme Court's decision in R.A. V., says that cities should be able to
outlaw some racist speech-such as burning crosses-because it
discourages others from speaking. "It . . . interferes with their speech
rights. It discourages them from participating in the deliberative activities
of society. They feel less entitled and less inclined to voice their views in
the public square and more inclined to withdraw unto themselves."'" This
view transforms "freedom of speech" into "freedom not to be discouraged
from speaking freely" and allows enforcement of this new freedom against
purely private parties by an authoritarian, speech-stifling government.
Here, in the name of freedom, freedom is crushed.
Of course the government should be able to restrict conduct that
actually prohibits equal access to forums open to others, but what Professor
Fiss suggests is something akin to a heckler's veto. So speech rights would
depend on the relative sensitivity and intestinal fortitude of the listener-or
more accurately, what a government official or judge perceives them to be.
This is really no different than the outright censoring of offensive speech.
Professor Fiss also suggests that encouraging freedom of speech should
not necessarily be any more important to a free society than ensuring
equality.72 Professor Vicki Jackson elaborates on this suggestion, and
argues that the more recent amendments-such as the Thirteenth and
Fourteenth-should be considered first when interpreting the First
Amendment. "My suggestion is that in resolving interpretive questions we
try instead (or rather, in addition) to begin with the more recent
amendments and what they stand for and read these more contemporaneous
constitutional commitments back into the older portions."73 Her rationale is
that these later amendments more accurately reflect the current views of the
70. 445 F.3d at 1206-07 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
71. Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court and the Problem of Hate Speech, 24 CAP. U. L. REV.
281, 287 (1995).
72. Id. at 286-87.
73. Vicki C. Jackson, Holistic Interpretation, Comparative Constitutionalism, And Fiss-lan
Freedoms, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 265, 266-67 (2003).
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populace, thus elevating the importance of feeling equal above freedom of
speech in certain circumstances.74 She opines:
[H]ate speech is not only of very low value in terms of any
plausible First Amendment interests, but it also inflicts high injuries
to the equal human dignity of its victims. The First Amendment's
capacity to protect dissent and disagreement may not be well served
by expanding the scope of its coverage to areas of very low value
speech, like racial insults.75
Jackson relies primarily upon the constitutions and court rulings of other
countries such as Canada and Germany76 for this subjection of freedom of
expression to feeling equal.77
The threat to speech freedom by reliance on foreign methodologies,
such as those of Canada or Germany, is demonstrated by the views of
Professor Michael Rosenfeld, who argues that:
[s]o long as the pluralist contemporary state is committed to
maintaining diversity, it cannot simply embrace a value neutral
mindset, and consequently it cannot legitimately avoid engaging in
some minimum of viewpoint discrimination....
[A]t a minimum contemporary pluralist democracy ought to
institutionalize viewpoint discrimination against the crudest and
most offensive expressions of racism, religious bigotry and virulent
bias on the basis of ethnic or national origin.7"
This argument is facially attractive within the context of racist speech-
especially in Germany where propaganda was used by the Nazis to facilitate
the Holocaust. But there certainly is a difference between governmental
racist speech and racist speech by private individuals. And when the same
principles are applied to religious proselytizing speech, the results are
alarming. Such application is contemplated by Rosenfeld, who defines hate
speech as "speech designed to promote hatred on the basis of race, religion,
ethnicity or national origin."79
In light of the abhorrence of viewpoint discrimination in our
jurisprudence, the examples of viewpoint discrimination that Rosenfeld
says should be permissible are shocking. He maintains that "black hate
speech ought not be penalized-or at least not as much as otherwise-if it
occurs in the course of a spontaneous reaction to a police shooting of an
74. Id. at 278.
75. Id. at 309.
76. Id. at 285-92.
77. See John 0. McGinnis, Foreign to our Constitution, 100 Nw. U. L. REV. 303 (2006) for a
persuasive analysis of why relying on foreign jurisprudence to overturn longstanding laws in this
country is very dangerous and a threat to our sovereignty.
78. Michael Rosenfeld, Hate Speech in Constitutional Jurisprudence: A Comparative
Analysis, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1523, 1561-62 (2003).
79. Id. at 1523 (emphasis added).
Prince or Pauper?
innocent black victim in a locality with widespread perceptions of racial
bias within the police department."8 It is especially troubling when
compared with hate speech that Rosenfeld believes is permissible.
[S]trong criticism of the Pope for his opposition to contraception
and to homosexual relationships as being "indifferent to human
suffering caused by overpopulation and an enemy of human dignity
for all" may be highly offensive to Catholics, but even in a country
where Catholics are a religious minority should clearly not be
officially censored, punished or characterized as hate speech.8'
Rosenberg justifies sanctioned viewpoint discrimination by arguing that
fostering equality and human dignity is as important-if not more important-
than freedom of expression, as is the case in Canada and Germany.8"
Germany treats freedom of expression as one constitutional right
among many, rather than as paramount or even as first among
equals. Whereas under the Canadian Constitution, freedom of
expression is limited by constitutionally mandated vindications of
equality and multiculturalism, under the German Basic Law,
freedom of expression must be balanced against the pursuit of
dignity and group-regarding concerns.83
But these countries do not have the long history and social fabric that
requires that freedom of expression, including insulting speech, be
paramount. In fact, our system is premised on the idea that free speech is
necessary to a free people, making Rosenberg's proposal anathema. His
idea simply cannot work in a country where people are truly free. As
Justice Cardozo observed in 1937 while discussing which of the guarantees
in the Bill of Rights should be incorporated or "absorbed" into the
Fourteenth Amendment so as to apply to the States:
the process of absorption has had its source in the belief that neither
liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed. This is true,
for illustration, of freedom of thought and speech. Of that freedom
one may say that it is the matrix, the indispensable condition, of
nearly every other form of freedom. With rare aberrations a
pervasive recognition of that truth can be traced in our history,
political and legal.84
Freedom of speech is "the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty," and
is a right "so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be
ranked as fundamental."85
80. Id. at 1528.
81. Id. at 1564-65.
82. Id. at 1541.
83. Id. at 1548.
84. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326-27 (1937) (internal citations omitted), overruled
on other grounds, Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
85. Id. at 325 (quotation marks omitted).
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The protection of not just speech, but offensive and insulting speech, is
vital to our way of life in the United States. An excellent example of this is
Terminiello v. City of Chicago, which was decided in 1949 during an era
when fear of Communism ran rampant, and the evils of Fascism were still
fresh in everyone's mind.86 Father Terminiello was a Catholic priest who
belonged to a group called the Christian Veterans of America, which was
vehemently anti-communist, but definitely had fascist leanings-though
Father Terminiello denied that he was fascist.8"
The case arose from a fine levied against Father Terminiello for a
speech he delivered to members of his group in Chicago. The speech
included references to the Bible, was very anti-communist, and anti-
Semitic. A crowd of over one thousand people gathered outside the
building and was very unruly, so Terminiello was fined $100 because "his
speech stirred people to anger, invited public dispute, or brought about a
condition of unrest."88  Despite the fact that his views would almost
certainly be categorized as hate speech in today's world, the Supreme Court
reversed, and explained its decision as follows:
The vitality of civil and political institutions in our society depends
on free discussion. As Chief Justice Hughes wrote in De Jonge v.
Oregon, it is only through free debate and free exchange of ideas
that government remains responsive to the will of the people and
peaceful change is effected. The right to speak freely and to
promote diversity of ideas and programs is therefore one of the
chief distinctions that sets us apart from totalitarian regimes.
Accordingly a function of free speech under our system of
government is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high
purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates
dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to
anger. Speech is often provocative and challenging. It may strike
at prejudices and preconceptions and have profound unsettling
effects as it presses for acceptance of an idea.89
Twenty years later and in the context of an anti-war protest in a public
school (where speech freedom is necessarily somewhat restricted), the
Supreme Court cited Terminiello and observed that:
[a]ny departure from absolute regimentation may cause trouble.
Any variation from the majority's opinion may inspire fear. Any
word spoken, in class, in the lunchroom, or on the campus, that
deviates from the views of another person may start an argument or
cause a disturbance. But our Constitution says we must take this
86. 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
87. Id. at 22 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (Justice Jackson outlines the facts and Terminiello's
speech in detail).
88. Id. at 5.
89. Id. (internal citations omitted).
Prince or Pauper?
risk; and our history says that it is this sort of hazardous freedom-
this kind of openness-that is the basis of our national strength and
of the independence and vigor of Americans who grow up and live
in this relatively permissive, often disputatious, society.90
So while Professors Fiss, Jackson, and Rosenfeld are certainly correct
in asserting that equality is a very important aspect of our freedom-indeed
the Declaration of Independence asserts that all men are created equal-
equality does not require censorship. "Equality" means that all parties have
the same free speech rights, not that some speakers' views can be banned
simply because others may perceive them as insulting and feel less equal.
This is very significant for all speech that may be offensive to others, but
especially so for religious proselytizing speech. An attempt to persuade
another that one's religious views are correct often necessarily implies
theirs are not, and therefore are less equal. Equality requires that the
listener gets to reject views disagreed with, and attempt to persuade the
speakers that they are wrong. The interest in fostering equality must not be
allowed to censor speech.
A. COMMUNITARIAN VERSUS LIBERTARIAN VALUES
One common theme amongst those advocating for what is essentially a
hate speech exception to the First Amendment is that we should be
fostering communitarian values rather than libertarian.9  But who
determines what is "communitarian?" Is it that the majority, or possibly
elite judges, decrees what is or is not orthodox for the American people?
This position mandates the "orthodoxy" that the Supreme Court says
government officials are prohibited from prescribing in West Virginia State
Board of Education v. Barnette.92
In Barnette, the Supreme Court addressed the refusal by several
Jehovah's Witness students to recite the pledge of allegiance because it
violated their religious convictions. On January 9, 1942-just one month
after the attack on Pearl Harbor-the West Virginia State Board of
Education adopted a resolution requiring students to salute the flag and
recite the Pledge of Allegiance in public schools.93 The plaintiffs were
Jehovah's Witness students and their parents who alleged that the new
resolution conflicted with their religious beliefs and violated the right to,
inter alia, the freedom of speech and religion.94 The State, adopting a
communitarian approach, argued that this intrusion on First Amendment
rights was justified by its interest in "fostering and perpetuating the ideals,
90. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508-09 (1969) (citing Terminiello,
337 U.S. 1).
91. See Reichman at 98, n.87.
92. 319 U.S. 624(1943).
93. Id. at 626.
94. Id. at 630.
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principles, and spirit of Americanism."95  The Court later distilled this
argument: "National unity is the basis of national security, . . . and hence..
• compulsory measures toward 'national unity' are constitutional."96 But the
Court found that there is a significant difference between government
coerced conformity and fostering unity "by persuasion and example." '97 The
Court elaborates on this principle in a passage that is remarkably relevant to
the issue of hate speech and forced conformity to the majority's notions of
equality today.
Struggles to coerce uniformity of sentiment in support of some end
thought essential to their time and country have been waged by
many good as well as by evil men. Nationalism is a relatively
recent phenomenon but at other times and places the ends have
been racial or territorial security, support of a dynasty or regime,
and particular plans for saving souls. As first and moderate
methods to attain unity have failed, those bent on its
accomplishment must resort to an ever-increasing severity. As
governmental pressure toward unity becomes greater, so strife
becomes more bitter as to whose unity it shall be. Probably no
deeper division of our people could proceed from any provocation
than from finding it necessary to choose what doctrine and whose
program public educational officials shall compel youth to unite in
embracing. Ultimate futility of such attempts to compel coherence
is the lesson of every such effort from the Roman drive to stamp
out Christianity as a disturber of its pagan unity, the Inquisition, as
a means to religious and dynastic unity, the Siberian exiles as a
means to Russian unity, down to the fast failing efforts of our
present totalitarian enemies.98
The "present totalitarian enemies" referred to by the Court were the Axis
powers. Ironically, or tellingly, one of these was Germany, which is now
being held out as a model for how to censor hate speech by some
commentators. But in the United States, unlike Germany, "[a]uthority here
is to be controlled by public opinion, not public opinion by authority."99
This is one of our foundational and most cherished principles. And it is
completely contrary to the more elitist and communitarian view that the
masses really are not capable of governing themselves and require the
fetters of civil government to restrain them.
Despite repeated abuses and repudiations, this elitist view will not die.
For instance, the Canadian Supreme Court cited in support of its approval
of restrictions on hate speech a parliamentary study which found:
95. Id. at 625.
96. Id. at 640.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 640-41.
99. Id. at 641.
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The successes of modem advertising, the triumphs of impudent
propaganda such as Hitler's, have qualified sharply our belief in the
rationality of man. We know that under strain and pressure in times
of irritation and frustration, the individual is swayed and even
swept away by hysterical, emotional appeals. We act irresponsibly
if we ignore the way in which emotion can drive reason from the
field."'
Once again, the majority opinion in Barnette proves to be incredibly
insightful on the issue of whether American citizens are rational enough to
make their own decisions about how to foster community.
[W]e apply the limitations of the Constitution with no fear that
freedom to be intellectually and spiritually diverse or even contrary
will disintegrate the social organization. To believe that patriotism
will not flourish if patriotic ceremonies are voluntary and
spontaneous instead of a compulsory routine is to make an
unflattering estimate of the appeal of our institutions to free minds.
We can have intellectual individualism and the rich cultural
diversities that we owe to exceptional minds only at the price of
occasional eccentricity and abnormal attitudes.' 0
The Court then goes on to conclude: "If there is any fixed star in our
constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe
what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of
opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein."'0 2
Forced conformity to what the government views as communitarian is
not only futile, it is completely contrary to our governing structure. More
importantly, it is dangerous. "Those who begin coercive elimination of
dissent soon find themselves exterminating dissenters. Compulsory
unification of opinion achieves only the unanimity of the graveyard."'0 3
B. THE ROLE OF FOREIGN JURISPRUDENCE
A second theme common to arguments endorsing a hate speech
exception to the First Amendment is reliance on foreign law. Restricting
religious proselytization is certainly nothing new in other countries. °4
Some Muslim countries actually outlaw conversion from Islam to other
religions and consequently prohibit all attempts to persuade others to do
so. ' 5 Non-Muslim countries also ban proselytizing, sometimes because
national culture is built around a particular religion, so proselytizing is seen
100. Regina v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697, 747.
101. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 641-42.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 641.
104. See generally, Natan Lerner, Proselytism, Change of Religion and International Human
Rights, 12 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 477 (1998).
105. Lerner, supra, at 522-24.
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as an attack on national identity.0 6 For example, Greece had a long
standing provision in its constitution and statutes that specifically prohibited
religious proselytization, which was struck down by the European Court of
Human Rights in Kokkinakis v. Greece."°7 The court recognized that the
prohibition was an attempt to protect adherents to the Eastern Orthodox
Church because of the Church's profound impact on Greek society. "The
Christian Eastern Orthodox Church, which during nearly four centuries of
foreign occupation symboli[z]ed the maintenance of Greek culture and the
Greek language, took an active part in the Greek people's struggle for
emancipation, to such an extent that Hellenism is to some extent identified
with the Orthodox faith."'
10 8
Another reason religious proselytizing speech may be viewed
differently than other forms of persuasive speech is that it has on occasion
actually taken the form of forced conversion,'°9or targeted individuals who
are susceptible to deception. For instance, Greece defended its ban on
proselytizing by noting that it was originally instituted to protect against the
targeting of schoolchildren by evangelical groups." ° Thus, any current
attempt to convince others to convert-no matter how benign-is viewed
with suspicion.
Of course, the good news is that the European Court of Human Rights
recognized that proselytizing is an important part of religious freedom in
Kokkinakis, and struck down Greece's ban. The facts of that case involved
Jehovah's Witness members, Minos Kokkinakis and his wife, who visited
the home of Mrs. Kyriakaki, and talked with her about their beliefs. They
also attempted to convince her to change her Orthodox beliefs. Mrs.
Kyriakaki's husband happened to be the cantor at the local Orthodox
Church, and he informed the authorities, who later arrested Mr. and Mrs.
Kokkinakis."' The Court found that the ban on religious proselytization
violated Article 9 of the Human Rights Convention which states: "Everyone
has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right
includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone
or in community with others and in public or in private, to manifest his
religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance."
'
"
12
Unfortunately, european courts have severely limited Article 9's
protection of proselytizing by interpreting subsection 2 of the Article to
allow for banning any speech that may be offensive to others-effectively
codifying a heckler's veto. Subsection 2 of Article 9 provides: "Freedom to
106. Lemer, supra, at 528-29.
107. 17 Eur. Ct. H.R. 397, 403-03 (1994).
108. Id. at 403.
109. Lerner, supra, at 505-6.
110. 17 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 403.
111. Id. at 399-400.
112. Id. at411-14.
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manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as
are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the
interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or
morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others." On its
face, this seems reasonable. But application of this principle has proven to
be disastrous for religious speech. For example, in a United Kingdom case,
Hammond v. Department of Public Prosecutions, the court found that Mr.
Hammond was properly prosecuted and convicted for breach of the peace
because of the negative reactions of folks in the street to his sign saying that
homosexual behavior is immoral." 3
Mr. Hammond, of Bournemouth, England, was a committed Christian
who felt compelled to share his religious beliefs with others. Accordingly,
he carried a sign to the square in Bournemouth that said, "'Stop Immorality,
Stop Homosexuality and Stop Lesbianism.""' 4 The sign also said, "Jesus is
Lord" in each of the four corners." 5 A crowd of approximately 30 or 40
people gathered, many of whom were personally insulted and became upset
and angry. Two constables arrived and "found the crowd to be agitated,
angry and insulted.""' 6 Some of them "expressed outrage" that Mr.
Hammond had not been arrested, and attempted to take his sign from him,
caused him to fall down, and poured water on him."7 Mr. Hammond was
then arrested, charged with breach of the peace, and convicted." 8 The Act
he was charged with violating stated in part: "A person is guilty of an
offence if he . . . (b) displays any writing, sign or other visible
representation which is threatening, abusive or insulting within the hearing
or sight of a person likely to be caused harassment, alarm or distress
thereby."'
On appeal, the court recognized that "the Article 9 freedom to manifest
one's religion is not only exercisable in the community of others, in public
and within the circle of whose faith one shares, but can also be exercised
alone and in private. Furthermore, it includes, in principle, the right to try
to convince one's neighbour, for example through teaching."' 2 ° The court
also recognized that Article 10, the free speech provision of the Convention,
"applies whether or not a speech is shocking, offensive or disturbing," and
acknowledged the defendant's argument that restricting his speech because
of hostility from the crowd to his views amounted to a heckler's veto. 2'
113. [2004] EWHC (Admin.) 69 (Eng.).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
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Nevertheless, the appeals court upheld the conviction because people
were insulted by Mr. Hammond's speech. The-court found that, under the
Convention, in order to restrict Mr. Hammond's speech, it must be shown
that "it was for a legitimate aim, and it is not challenged that the magistrates
found that the restriction had a legitimate aim of preventing disorder...
[and] the restriction was necessary in a democratic society."' 22 The court of
appeals accepted the trial court's four reasons submitted to meet these
requirements:
[First], that the words on the sign were directed specifically towards
the homosexual and lesbian communities, implying that they were
immoral; secondly, that there was a need to show tolerance towards
all sections of society; thirdly, that the sign was displayed in the
town centre on a Saturday afternoon provoking hostility from
members of the public; and fourthly, Mr. Hammond's behavior
went beyond legitimate protest and was provoking violence and
disorder and it interfered with the rights of others.'23
This willingness to allow censorship of religious proselytizing because
it may be offensive can be seen outside Western Europe also. For instance,
the Supreme Court of Israel upheld the conviction of a young woman who
was sentenced to jail for three years for violating a statute that prohibits
hurting the "religious feelings of others."'2 4 Tatyana Suszkin was arrested
and convicted for being in possession of posters depicting Mohammed as a
pig. While Ms. Suszkin did not appear to be attempting to communicate
any particular teaching of her Jewish faith, the statute is so broad that it
could be read to prohibit such statements as "the Jews are the chosen people
and are therefore 'superior,' the Jews have sinned for not accepting Jesus,
[and] Muhammad is the bearer of truth and the last prophet that ought not
be ridiculed."' 2 5 Professor Reichman analyzes the Suszkin case in depth in
his article, and concludes that, at least in Israel, "Speech, or an expressive
act that humiliates Muslim worshipers, therefore, has a weaker claim to
heightened constitutional protection ... because that very speech violates
other aspects of the right of human dignity, such as a Muslim's right to be
free from dignitary harm on account of their religious beliefs."'26 Professor
Reichman opines that the rationale underlying this suppression of speech in
Israel and in other countries like Canada is that the right to "human dignity"
is just as important as the right to freedom of speech.'2 7
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. CrimC (Jer) 436/97 Israel v. Suszkin, [1997] IsrDC 97(5) 730.
125. Amnon Reichman, The Passionate Expression of Hate: Constitutional Protections,
Emotional Harm and Comparative Law, 31 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 76, 112 (2007).
126. Id. at 91.
127. Id. at 90-91. Also described are numerous other differences between Israel and the U.S.
possibly affecting the outcome in Suszkin, including the lack of separation of church and state in
Israel, which he suggests explains why the government is not viewed with mistrust by its citizens.
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Of course, the speech treated as a pauper in Hammond and in Suszkin
sounds exactly like the kind of speech the Supreme Court of the United
States has said is esteemed like a prince in this country. For example, in
Cantwell v. Connecticut, the defendant's speech was directed toward the
Catholic community, implying that they were evil, and Mr. Cantwell was
speaking on the public sidewalk in a predominantly Catholic area and
provoked hostility from others.'28 Yet the Supreme Court reversed his
conviction for breach of the peace. This is because free speech is actually a
vital aspect of the dignity for all that is trumpeted so forcefully in the
Declaration of Independence. The Supreme Court has recognized that the
protection of freedom of expression is based on "the belief that no other
approach would comport with the premise of individual dignity and choice
upon which our political system rests."'' 29
Hammond and Suszkin demonstrate the marked difference between
religious expression in other countries, and application of the First
Amendment in the United States. Simply put, speech that may be insulting
or offensive (i.e., hate speech) is precisely the kind of speech the First
Amendment was designed to protect.'3 ° Indeed, if the speech gives no
offense, there is little need for it to be protected at all. Thus, the very
creation of speech protections suggests that the speech sought to be
sequestered from government regulation is exactly the type which would
give offense.
V. CONCLUSION
The threat to religious proselytizing speech can be boiled down to an
attempt to depose liberty and replace it with community. But like any coup,
the change in leadership that appears attractive at the outset often results in
anarchy or oppression that has disastrous repercussions for years to come.
Forbidding religious persuasive speech in an effort to avoid offending those
who may disagree strikes at the very core of our social and legal
foundations in the United States. As the Supreme Court sagely pointed out
in Barnette, forced conformity to an ideal meant to facilitate a sense of
community does not work, and leads to a totalitarian regime where the
views of a few are imposed upon the many.'3 ' The small, but growing
effort to relegate religious proselytizing speech to a status of minimal First
Amendment protection should be viewed for what it is-blatant viewpoint
128. 310U.S. at301-303.
129. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 24 (emphasis added).
130. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) ("If there is a bedrock principle
underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an
idea simply because society finds the idea offensive or disagreeable."); United States. v. Eichman,
496 U.S. 310, 319 (1990) (same).
131. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 640-41.
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discrimination justified by a misguided attempt to protect listeners from
feelings of offense. The royal pedigree of religious speech as the prince of
First Amendment jurisprudence should not be so lightly cast aside.
